I Introduction
One of the striking differences between American and Commonwealth work on private law is the very different place accorded the law of restitution (or unjust enrichment).
2 In contrast to the Commonwealth, where restitution is an area that attracts considerable scholarly attention, in the United States, the subject is an academic backwater. Describing the American scene a few years ago, John Langbein said that '[i]t is as though a neutron bomb has hit the field -the monuments have been left standing, but the people have been killed off.' 3 Langbein's explanation for this grim state of affairs puts the blame on the 'terrible toll that the realist movement has inflicted on doctrinal study in post-Second World War USA.' 4 More recently, Chaim Saiman has advanced essentially the same view: 'Commonwealth restitution discourse is largely a product of pre-or anti-realist legal thought which generates scepticism from the mainstream American academic establishment.' 5 In essence, 2 This first sentence already calls for three clarifications. First, while my main focus and examples throughout the article will come from English law, I believe that what I say applies, to a certain degree, to other Commonwealth jurisdictions. This is because the first impetus for developing this area of law in the Commonwealth came from English lawyers and also because I think ideas about the relationship between law and politics in England have had considerable influence on the political tradition in the rest of the Commonwealth. Nonetheless, the fact that, in recent years, different Commonwealth jurisdictions have been carving their own path may be an indication of the decline, even in these jurisdictions, of the view that private law is a domain that exists outside politics. See the discussion in Part II.B below. Second, the term private law, and the division between private and public law that it presupposes, is not neutral. In the United States, in particular, many would argue that, in an important sense, all law is public law. I use the term, therefore, only as shorthand for contract, tort, property, and restitution, without committing myself to any substantive view on the question of in what sense (if any) private law is private. Finally, whether restitution and unjust enrichment form a distinct area of law is a subject of considerable debate, which I intend to avoid here. I trust, however, that the terms 'restitution' and 'unjust enrichment' are familiar enough to identify the subject matter I am concerned with in this article. 3 John Langbein, 'The Later History of Restitution' in WR Cornish et al, eds, Restitution Past, Present, and Future: Essays in Honour of Gareth Jones (Oxford: Hart, 1998) 57 at 61 [Langbein] . 4 Ibid at 62. Langbein adds another explanation that has to do with the rise of economic analysis of law. But in a way it is the same explanation, for the rise and success of economic analysis of law (as opposed to other interdisciplinary approaches to law) is the other side of the decline of doctrinal scholarship. I would contend that part of the success of economic analysis of law in the United States has to do with a perception (whether justified or not) among American academic lawyers that it could provide a degree of certainty that legal doctrine does not possess. 5 Chaim Saiman, 'Restitution in America: Why the US Refuses to Join the Global Restitution Party' (2008) 28 Oxford J Legal Stud 99 at 103. This explanation is accepted in the view is that legal realism has led to a decline in respect for the sort of doctrinal analysis that has been the driving force behind restitution in English and Commonwealth law. This difference between American and English (and perhaps more broadly Commonwealth) legal scholarship is a familiar one, 6 but as an explanation for the American lack of interest in restitution it suffers from a fundamental flaw: it is true that doctrinal scholarship in the United States is held in low regard and it is thus not surprising that American legal scholars have not taken much interest in the largely doctrinal scholarship that dominates academic work on restitution in the Commonwealth. 7 But this, of course, is no more true of restitution than it is true of contract law, tort law, and many other areas of law which were once dominated by doctrinal scholarship in the United States. Yet, as even a cursory glance at American law journals reveals, there is a wealth of new work in these areas of law, albeit much of it in the style that some Commonwealth scholars call (with a whiff of derision) 'high theory.' So to say that there is little restitution scholarship in the United States because restitution scholarship is doctrinal is to beg the real question; namely, why there was no growth in the non-doctrinal restitution scholarship in the United States that has come to dominate even traditional common law areas like contract and tort law. 8 Langbein and Saiman's answer would convince only if, for some reason, restitution law somehow resisted non-doctrinal scholarship. Langbein actually comes close to suggesting this when he says that '[t]he study of restitution requires an environment that treats doctrine with respect.' 9 Langbein does not explain why restitution is different from other areas of law, but on its face, this claim seems odd. Hanoch Dagan's self-consciously realist and largely American-orientated work on restitution illustrates that this does not have to be the case. 10 Langbein may have meant by this statement that theoretical work on law can only emerge against a background of developed doctrine. I have my doubts about this view in general, as there are many examples of theoretical work on law that is developed directly against doctrine, or to fill gaps in doctrine, or is written with indifference to (or ignorance of) it. At any rate, in the case of unjust enrichment, the doctrinal foundation was there. As Langbein himself says, it was Americans who were the first in the common law world to start thinking about unjust enrichment in a doctrinally systematic way, and thanks to the efforts of a small group of scholars, the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment has just been published. 11 All along, drafts and discussions for this and the previous (unfinished) Restatement were published. These could have been grist to an aspiring scholar's mill; and yet, most American lawyers remained uninterested.
Saiman attempts to explain this divide by telling us that 'the amount of restitution law produced by a given [legal] system corresponds to the degree that restitutionary remedies are conceptualized as correlating to specific legal entitlements arising from property and contract. Hence, the less remedial discretion allotted to the courts, the greater the need for substantive law of restitution.' 12 But this is like saying that the more restitution law is perceived to be needed, the more of it will get produced. The question remains: why do different legal systems have different perceived needs for such developments? and for that matter, why are American lawyers less troubled by remedial discretion? But it turns out that this revival is, for the time being, only an expectation; see ibid at 1041. 12 Saiman, 'Restitution,' supra note 8 at 1039-40. It is these questions that this article seeks to address. The answer I propose for this puzzle has to do with the role unjust enrichment has played in English and Commonwealth law. I will argue that, for various reasons that will be explained below, American academic lawyers had no need for unjust enrichment; to English lawyers, by contrast, restitution law provided a solution to otherwise intractable problems. To understand why this was the case, we need to look into a matter that seems to bear no relationship to the question at hand; namely, the way American law and English law conceive of the relationship between law and politics. I argue that this difference leads to distinct ways of understanding the shape and limits of acceptable doctrinal innovation in the two legal systems. It is these differences, I will argue, that provide a more satisfying explanation for the trajectories restitution law and restitution scholarship took in these two countries.
If I am right about this, then this claim has broader significance than the rather narrow point from which it emerges. In the familiar distinctions among legal traditions, American law is often classified with the rest of the law of the English-speaking former British colonies as belonging to the 'common law' family. In some respects this classification is, of course, unobjectionable. But it is no secret that, in some respects, American law has taken a different path from the rest of the common law. Especially in the area of private law, Commonwealth lawyers, both academic and practising, seem to implicitly accept this parting of ways by showing less interest in American court decisions, which (despite their much larger number) are much less frequently cited or analysed in Commonwealth textbooks than are decisions from other Commonwealth jurisdictions; American legal scholarship in these areas is also, with a few exceptions, largely ignored. The present article seeks to provide part of an answer as to why. Interestingly, what emerges from it is that at least in this area, the familiar common law-civil law divide (one that some English doctrinal scholars rely on in seeking to restrict the influence or borrowings from other European legal systems) is misleading. In some important respects, English law is now much closer to European civil law than to American law.
One caveat: my account attempts to explain the different fates of restitution in English and American law as, in part, resulting from different fundamental perceptions of the relationship between law and politics. These differences are most visible from a certain distance; move closer and all patterns disappear, move away and differences vanish. No doubt one could find representatives of what I describe as the typical English approach on the American side and vice versa; in fact, later in this article, I extend my explanation to account for some of the debates among English restitution lawyers. Nevertheless, I believe that the patterns I describe are real and that they are crucial for understanding the different fates of restitution in the two countries.
Here is how my argument will unfold. I start with briefly, in PART II, presenting a sketch of the significance of ideas to legal thought, and will explain how this perspective helps in understanding the sort of explanation I will be offering here. In PART III, I explain the problem that restitution was meant to solve in English law. I argue that restitution was the means for solving existing problems that doctrine within other areas of law proved incapable of solving. This answer, however, raises an immediate question: why was there a need to develop these solutions outside these particular areas of law, instead of correcting the problems in existing doctrine? PART IV begins to answer this question by discussing an issue that looks, at first, far removed from doctrinal problems in private law; namely, the way in which different legal systems conceptualize the relationship between law and politics. I argue there that certain ways of understanding this relationship constrain the sorts of answers available within English doctrine. In PART V, I apply this distinction to the question of restitution and show how it explains the different fate of restitution in English and American law, both at the doctrinal level and in the work of scholars. II 
The power of ideas
The familiar version of the modern history of unjust enrichment in English law has the individual efforts of Robert Goff and Gareth Jones, of Peter Birks, and perhaps a few others scholars, as major turning points in changing an area of law that many doubted even existed into the most active area for new doctrinal scholarship. In this story, had it not been for the perseverance of these authors, English restitution law might have looked quite different today, as powerful voices were opposed to the addition of restitution (or unjust enrichment) to the list of recognized legal categories. Though in part true (and significant), this account is, in many respects, an example of the fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc. We know what happened, and so, we tell the story as though it was bound to happen. But compare this story to a different one: in the late 1970s, a group of scholars tried to import the then emerging ideas of law and economics into English legal scholarship. These studies were published in all the leading English journals, but what turned into a flood in the United States has had virtually no impact on English law. Had economic analysis caught on in Britain, no doubt these articles would have been hailed now as early precursors of what became a major development. As there was no such development, there is no story to tell. The very 538 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL (2013) 63 UTLJ © UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS different fates of restitution and economic analysis show that we need to look elsewhere for the missing ingredient in our story, the one that explains why certain ideas have impact while others do not.
The same question arises closer to our subject: had restitution been a success in the United States, William Keener, the author of the first English language treatise on the subject, and even more so Austin Scott and Warren Seavey, the reporters of the 1937 Restatement of Restitution, would have been hailed as visionary path-breakers, minor heroes in the pantheon of American law. But as restitution languished at the dark corners of American law and their work has been neglected, the names of Keener, Scott, and Seavey have largely been forgotten. They are now familiar only to the small coterie of scholars who keep the feeble flame of American restitution law alive. It is not enough, then, to show that new ideas started with someone. They always do. The question is what makes certain ideas stick. The rest of the article attempts to explain what that extra ingredient is in the context of restitution.
Before I turn to that question, I must preface my account with a short explanation of a more general kind. Legal systems are not just the sum of norms (rules, principles). A crucial element in understanding legal systems is what might be called the 'ideology' of the legal system. I use the term 'ideology' in a non-pejorative sense, and it is not limited to (although it includes) the political orientation of the legal system to non-legal ideas: different legal systems can both be politically 'liberal' and yet have a very different ideology in other regards. Thus, ideology will include attitudes regarding the openness of the legal system, the role of courts and lawyers in the legal system, the relative weight a given legal system tends to give to certainty over other considerations, and so on. This ideology will affect foundational questions, such as the appropriate issues for the legal system to deal with and the appropriate ways of dealing with them, as well as more mundane issues like the appropriate methods for interpreting legal materials, the amount of deference that should be given to other branches of government, and so on. 13 This is why legal ideology is both powerful and easy to miss. As the ideology of a legal system is part of the background of all law, it is easy to overlook how contingent it is and to treat local attitudes as part of the order of the world. And because, in one way or another, it affects all aspects of a legal system, it is often very difficult to change.
This has important implications for understanding the limits of legal change. It is because of the ideological component of legal systems that good norms from other legal systems often do not travel well between jurisdictions. Ignoring ideology, a lawmaker seeking to improve the laws of her jurisdiction could simply look for those norms best supported by reason or to ideas coming from any existing or imaginary jurisdiction, and all would be equally good candidates for importation. In reality, this is not often the case. New legal ideas have staying power to the extent that they can be made to fit within the existing ideology of a legal system. What this means is that they will be treated as valuable when they are perceived to offer adequate solutions to (what are taken to be) open problems. Ideas that satisfy only one of these two conditions are likely to be considered (at best) interesting for 'academic' discussion but irrelevant in practice. Once a solution is incorporated into a legal system, it becomes part of the background against which new ideas and new solutions to other problems are assessed. Because new ideas are incorporated to the extent that they fit existing legal ideology, legal change will quite often operate through a kind of feedback loop mechanism that tends to deepen the ideological path to which a legal system is already committed. It is through this mechanism that initially small differences between legal systems can become more pronounced with time until, at a certain point, meaningful exchange of ideas between the legal systems becomes difficult. 14 Just as the geographical separation of two groups belonging to a single species can lead to speciation, the separation of legal systems can lead to legal system speciation. Because the reshaping and changing of legal systems happens through conscious efforts rather than random change, reversing course is easier in the domain of legal ideas than in the biological world, but it is noteworthy that, when such efforts at reversing courses are made, the change is often accompanied by efforts to expose or invent (the two are not always easily distinguished) a shared origin.
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In what follows I will try to demonstrate that it is the ideology of English and American law and, in particular, their fundamental and 14 More precisely, when ideological differences between legal systems are initially small, unequal access to new ideas can reinforce existing differences and result in the legal systems' drifting away from each other. Geography, language, and political ties have traditionally been the source of unequal access to new ideas. Globalization and technology may overcome some of these barriers but not necessarily others. At the same time, they may exacerbate the problem of information glut that often leads to discrimination in favour of more local or more similar ideas. There is, of course, much more to be said about these issues. fundamentally different attitudes to the relationship between law and politics that explain the different fates of restitution law in these countries.
III Unjust enrichment as the solution to the problem of unjust doctrine
Since much of the Commonwealth doctrinal scholarship on unjust enrichment has been in one way or another a development of, or a reaction to, the work of Peter Birks, it will be helpful to start with him. Birks was the first to admit that many of his most fundamental ideas about law in general and restitution law in particular were derived from Roman law. What made his ideas so influential, however, was that he did not develop these ideas within the niche area of Roman law scholarship. Rather, for the most part, he translated them in to concepts that made them comprehensible to the English common lawyer. He argued that these ideas could provide doctrinally respectable solutions to existing legal problems in English law. Though he never wrote a treatise on restitution, his work followed a path that was familiar to contemporary English private lawyers: it was based on 'look[ing] downwards to the cases' 16 and was conceived as a non-political investigation into 'lawyers' law.' These methodological commitments led to two substantive principles that were at the heart of Birks's thinking on unjust enrichment. The first was that unjust enrichment is a member in full standing of the law of obligations alongside contract and tort. What Birks meant by this was not merely that unjust enrichment law was a useful way of organizing material for pedagogical or explanatory purposes but that unjust enrichment represented a basic legal category, one that corresponded to the real divisions of the law. 17 Birks's second commitment was that unjust enrichment, despite its name, has relatively little to do with justice. Birks could I wish to present a picture that challenges both points. I believe there are no true legal categories over and above the categories we create. The way courts classify cases may, for certain purposes, be a useful way of classifying them. But, in other instances, different classifications can be more useful. There is nothing wrong with classifying the topic of vitiated contracts within contract law or that of gain-based remedies for wrongs under tort law; there is also nothing wrong with classifying them, for different purposes, as part of the law of restitution. Legal scholars do not discover categories that are true but rather articulate categories that are useful. Of course, some categories may be more useful than others, but even here, the useful classifications for a lawyer representing a hospital may be very different from those useful for a university lecturer.
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The second point is that, contrary to the view that unjust enrichment has little to do with justice, I contend that a main reason why restitution law flourished in English law is because it provided a doctrinally respectable way of avoiding what were perceived to be unjust results in other areas of law. It is for this reason that restitution law looks so much like the result of a campaign of looting other legal categories: a bit from contract, a chunk from tort, something from property, with a dash of equity. A couple of examples will help substantiate this point. Consider, first, the simple, 'core case' of unjust enrichment -mistaken payment. 20 Why does this case require legal intervention? The answer must include two elements. The first is that the outcome where the recipient retains the money is deemed 'wrong.' By wrong, I do not mean legally wrong; I mean a situation that is, in some inarticulate sense, morally problematic. Now, there can be all kinds of elaborate theories having to do with autonomy, self-determination, economic efficiency, or fairness to explain why such a situation in which the payee retains the mistaken payment is 'wrong,' and these different explanations may lead to real differences in certain contexts. Birks, however, presents this case as an axiom, one that requires no explanation and cannot be questioned and one that would remain true even if the law did not correspond to it. This view supports my claim that retaining mistaken payments is perceived, even by unjust enrichment scholars, as a moral wrong. Assume he is right in treating this is a core case. The question for the lawyer, then, is how the law should deal with these kinds of situation. Unjust enrichment scholars have argued that the doctrine of unjust enrichment is necessary for handling such cases, but it is not immediately clear why. It is obvious that ownership is not always matched by possession and that there is nothing wrong with that: books could not be lent and houses could not be rented if that were not the case. But such separation of ownership from possession usually requires a voluntary act on part of the owner; when such a voluntary act is not present, then (typically) the owner has a claim for retaining possession quite simply as one of the 'incidents of ownership.' 21 The basic idea invoked here -'This is mine! Give it back to me' -is so simple that toddlers begin to grasp it when they are about fourteen months old. 22 Therefore, a possible way of handling cases of mislaid, forgotten, or mistakenly given property is by appealing to this simple idea, something that even the most enthusiastic supporters of unjust enrichment admit. commonly think of as reasons for the transfer of property (e.g., voluntary action) have not been met. This mismatch between our intuitive ideas of property and the requirements of property law is deemed by us to be unjust, not (merely) in the legal sense of invoking a restitutionary claim, but in the everyday meaning of the term: it is considered morally problematic; it is considered 'wrong.' For whatever reason, many people think that absent-mindedness should not normally suffice for losing one's property, regardless of niceties of legal title. When this point is recognized, it is natural to go back to the very same proprietary ideas that were relied upon before. What explains the doctrine here, what distinguishes cases in which the payment should be returned from cases (such as those involving gifts) in which it should not, has to do with our underlying ideas of property. In the case of a mistaken payment, there was no conscious, willed decision to give the money to another; in the case of a cash gift, there was. And so, even in these cases, 'where unjust enrichment is most needed,' 24 it turns out that unjust enrichment does not explain the law's treatment of mistaken payment. If asked to describe this situation, we would say 'the money in question did not really belong to the payee, and therefore if she kept it she would be unjustly enriched,' not the other way around.
My other example is briefer and more specific. It is the problem known as the 'battle of the forms.' In such a case, what typically happens is that two parties try to contract by exchanging their standard form contracts. One party sends its own form, to which the other replies with its form. Performance then begins without either's form being formally accepted. The problem arises when the latter form is different in some important elements, from the first one. Traditional offer-and-acceptance analysis classifies the second form as a rejection of the original offer and a new counter-offer that was never accepted. In most cases, matters proceed without a hitch; but, obviously, sometimes they do not. What is to be done in such cases? When a case like this reached the English Court of Appeal, the bold spirit that was Lord Denning had no difficulty in asserting that the 'traditional analysis . . . is out of date,' 25 and he had no qualms about departing from it. The other judges agreed with him on the result, but they sought to do so by maintaining the traditional rules. What is interesting and important for the argument I will develop below is that, in England, there was academic support for the view that the right way to solve this problem is by appeal to restitution. 26 Though the issue is different, the structure of the argument is the same: we have a legal doctrine that leads to what is perceived as a problematic result and unjust enrichment is invoked to solve the problem.
Limits of space preclude me from offering other examples, but I believe that, for virtually every case in which unjust enrichment has been invoked as justification, a similar story could be told: a problem with a doctrine in some area of law and appeal to the 'principle against unjust enrichment' to solve it.
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IV The political foundations of doctrinal scholarship
The previous section considered some of the cases that doctrinal lawyers say belong to the law of unjust enrichment in order to show that the doctrine was used to circumvent unjust results created by other doctrines. This claim, however, raises an immediate question: if this is indeed the case, why was there a need for invoking unjust enrichment? It would have been easier to simply change the existing problematic doctrine instead of adding a further doctrinal layer in the shape of restitution law. Why have scholars opted for complex and circuitous solutions based on the vague idea of unjust enrichment when easier routes were available? The doctrinal answer offered to such a challenge is that 'it is trite law This does not cover all the cases that appear now in books on 'restitution,' but the remaining cases (such as those dealing with vitiated contracts) are cases of redrawing of boundaries between different areas of law. Here, the restitutionary analysis is superfluous: the only reason why it could be unjust not to return what one received as a result of a vitiated contract is some other rule (one presumably having to do with property) that would explain why it is wrong to retain whatever one received. It is then failing to comply with that rule that implies unjust enrichment. But if that is the case, unjust enrichment simply piggybacks on that other rule.
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I have already described in general terms what I take the right answer to be: the solutions adopted had to be perceived as adequate solutions to an open problem, and for reasons that I will try to explain below, unjust enrichment appeared an adequate solution whereas changing existing legal doctrine did not. This, at first, may seem odd. If there is something that common lawyers pride themselves (and their legal tradition) on, it is their pragmatism and flexibility and their dislike for excessive ('German') conceptualism. 30 Against this background, the rigid attitude suggested here may appear at first quite surprising. What could explain it?
There is what might be called the 'sinister' answer, offered by Jeremy Bentham and reiterated later by many others: lawyers adopt complex rules because it is in their interest to make sure that their services are needed. I have no doubt that there are cases to which Bentham's idea is applicable, but I think this case is not one of them, not least because the concern with restitution has, at least until recently, largely been an academic affair which actually had little impact on legal practice. 31 Furthermore, this argument cannot explain the difference between English and American law on the matter. Therefore, I wish to suggest a different explanation, and that is that a different understanding of the relationship between law and politics in these two legal systems has led to very different views on the limits on acceptable legal change. More specifically, my argument will be that, in some important sense, the simple solutions offered above are unavailable to English lawyers because they would be considered in some sense political and as such not legal and therefore inadequate. This view depends on a particular understanding of the relationship between law and politics, one according to which the two domains are largely separate and therefore some possible solutions to legal problems are not solutions that lawyers can properly suggest. By contrast, in the United States, where the prevailing view on the relationship between law and politics is fundamentally different, there was no similar barrier to adopting the simpler solutions. 28 My central argument is that English law and American law have different ideologies on the question of the relationship between law and politics. Now, if by 'politics' we mean questions concerning the distribution of resources in society, then few will doubt that law, even private law, is in some sense tied to politics. In another sense, there seems to be general agreement that all law, including public law, is separate from politics. All judges, for example, insist that, in deciding cases, they are following the law not their personal political opinions; and all agree that in some sense law is undermined when it is infiltrated by politics. And yet there is a wide space between these two extremes and an obvious sense in which American and Commonwealth law usually take rather different positions on the relations between law and politics, and American courts are touched by politics in a way that judges in the Commonwealth are not. Throughout American history, courts have often been asked to decide on politically controversial questions (such as slavery, abortion, health care, or same-sex marriage). There is also a burgeoning academic industry, frequently discussed also in the press, that analyses court decisions according to the judges' perceived political orientation. In the Commonwealth, to varying degrees, the courts do not play that role, and it is much rarer to consider judges' opinions in openly political terms.
This difference has its roots, in part, in the different political traditions of England (and through it, the rest of the Commonwealth) and the United States and in the relative role of law in political debates. 32 One of the most distinctive marks of American law and scholarship of the last century has been attempts to spell out ways by which American courts could somehow police and limit political discourse without entering into the forbidden territory of politics. Various 'theories' of judicial review were concerned with demarcating a proper role for courts when deciding on politically controversial cases: the search for 'neutral principles,' the distinction between principles and policies, the limitation of judicial review to infringements on the right to participate in the democratic process-these are all examples of this attempt. Similarly, the emergence of distinct 'theories' of statutory and constitutional interpretation were, to a large extent, a response to the need to keep law outside politics while dealing with and deciding on politically controversial matters. 33 The hallmark of the American approach -regardless of the very different solution proposed -has been the attempt to develop doctrinal and institutional tools for allowing courts some engagement with political discourse without their getting embroiled in political debates.
It is no coincidence that all these debates have had, especially until recent years, very little resonance in the rest of the common law world. The simple reason is that there was no need for them because the English (and Commonwealth) approach to the challenge of politics has been quite different. The prevailing view in these jurisdictions has been that law is the antithesis of politics and therefore that maintaining the distinction between law and politics requires identifying the two distinct domains of law and politics and keeping them, as much as possible, separate.
34 Dicey's influential interpretation of Parliamentary supremacy has been taken to mean that, beyond relatively undemanding tests of legal warrant, courts did not interfere with political decisions. Instead of devising complicated means for distinguishing permissible from impermissible engagements with politics, the mainstream view has been that the only approach that maintains democratic values and that guarantees the legitimacy of courts is that they altogether avoid politically controversial questions. A further means for keeping law separate from politics has been an invigorated distinction between private law and public law. This distinction was not traditionally central to the common law. Indeed, the belief that there was no such distinction in English law was, at one point, considered a central distinction between the common law and civil law traditions (as well as a barely concealed basis for pride in the superiority of the common law).
35 But in recent years, perhaps as a result of a sense that politics was increasingly intertwined in public law, the divide between public law and private law has emerged as a fundamental category of Commonwealth common law. Part of the motivation for separating private law from public law has been the view that private law is, necessarily, non-political. 36 On this view, law, or at least private law, is corrupted when its rules are subjected to politics. 37 A clinically clean statement of this view is found in Ernest Weinrib's provocative suggestion that 'the purpose of private law is simply to be private law.' Macmillan, 1885) at 177-9, 199-202, arguing that one of the meanings of the English rule of law is that all claims of individuals against the government must be framed as ordinary common-law claims. 36 See e.g. Birks, 'Equity in the Modern Law,' supra note 34 at 97-9, arguing that development of private law should be given to 'legal experts' in order to prevent the 'politicisation' of the law and 'the realist destruction of legal science'; Andrew To a lawyer seriously committed to this view, these words are not just a slogan. One of their practical implications is that they impose a limit on the permissible sources the lawyer should consult in her work. It is not simply that looking at the work of economists or philosophers is unnecessary for understanding and developing the law; for a proponent of this view it is, in an important sense, wrong to do so, for it is within the law that one need and should look for determining the content of legal change and it is legal materials that determine its acceptable limits. Another important aspect of this view is that private law is the domain of expert lawyers and should largely be left outside democratic decision making. It should not be legislated (for proponents of this view, the epitome of politics) 39 and, to the extent that it is legislatively changed, the change should be the result of work by a non-political (and doctrinal-lawyer-dominated) Law Commission.
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The most important practical implication of this view, for our purposes, is that legal change is considered a different kind of beast from political change of the law. Whereas the latter is (especially within the British system), in principle, still largely unconstrained by law, the former is governed by rules as to what count as 'permissible' moves. To use a word much favoured by proponents of the former view, legal change must have a certain form. This imposes limits on the outcomes one can reach, but it also imposes less discussed limits on the way to get to them.
This does not yet explain the difference between legal and political change. Isn't it obvious that change in the law must be grounded in some normative idea and as such must be grounded in political arguments? To proponents of the model of law and politics discussed here, the answer is 'no': to maintain the idea of law as a non-political domain it must be that legal change -one based on the law's own 'self-understanding,' on its own resources -be different from change based on any other discipline. One of the most familiar ways in which this idea is articulated is in the distinction courts always make between the kind of changes in the law they can bring about and the changes that can only be brought about by the legislature. It is often thought that such explanations are based on the worry that the courts will overstep into the legitimate domain of an elected Parliament; that is, that they will violate democratic legitimacy. And though this is true, quite often the focus of the explanation is subtly but importantly different: such unacceptable change is problematic because it requires stepping outside the legitimate powers of courts. These are not two sides of the same coin. It is not simply that the power of legal change by the courts ends where that of the legislature begins; on this view, there are independent considerations, having to do with the nature of (private) law, that limit courts' permissible action but have little to do with democracy.
The fundamental difference between the two has to do with the difference between acts of will and arguments of reason.
41 Political changebecause it derives its authority from democratic principles -is the domain of acts of will; by contrast, legal change -because its authority can come on this view only from within the law itself -is acceptable only if it comes from a reinterpretation of legal materials. Thus, on this view, legal change is acceptable only if, in some sense, it does not change the law at all. A politician seeking to change the law can simply declare, 'The law will be better if we change it in this way.' Odd as it may sound, from the perspective considered here, this simple and seemingly obvious line of argument is not available to the lawyer because what counts as 'better' is a political question, something on which people of different political persuasions will hold different views. This is why the lawyer must resort to a different kind of argument, one compelled by the legal materials themselves. Even when reaching the same outcome (and for that matter, even if the lawyer happens to share the view of the politician that the outcome would be 'better'), this can never be a reason for the change.
In theory, at least, the difference between the two approaches is vast, 42 and it explains some fundamental aspects of doctrinal legal practice. This, for example, is the foundation of the old idea -for which one finds support among doctrinal lawyers even today -that judges and lawyers never change the law, only discover it. 43 Even when not adopting such a view, the idea of abolishing a doctrine is treated with suspicion, for in some sense, it is not an acceptable move in the 'game'; it suggests a kind of breakdown of the rules. It is, perhaps, for this reason that the most natural (perhaps the only available) route for doing that is by arguing that the decision being overruled was 'wrongly decided' in the sense that it could not have been reached on any reasonable interpretation of existing legal materials at the time it was handed down. 44 Doing that makes it possible to 'return' the law from the wrong path it has taken to the true course it should always have taken, thereby seemingly not changing the law.
I need less space to describe the mainstream view among American lawyers because it is quite simply more or less the opposite. The starting point for debate among American lawyers is that, in an important sense, law is part of politics. Law is a means for achieving political ends, law can be used to pursue political ends, and legal institutions are a forum of political debate. This is clearly the case in contentious, highly visible constitutional cases, but it is also the case in 'private' law cases. It reflects a philosophy that rejects the divide between reason and will and conceives all of it as having its source in the will of the lawmakers. 45 Underneath this rather abstract idea one finds a whole range of different views, running the gamut from the view that law is politics with an odd jargon to the view that law is a kind of idealized politics. But the view that law is separate or autonomous from politics is, for the most part, treated as not just wrong, but naïve and even dangerous.
Because law in the United States is understood in more overtly political terms, legal change, including the abolition of existing doctrines, is easier to explain in more direct terms: if the law no longer serves whatever goal is set for it, it should be changed. Of course, even within this approach, courts operate under various constraints and judges do not simply decide cases any way they want. The difference is, however, that within this approach, the limits of legal argument and legal change are thought to be determined on the basis of political or institutional analysis, not on the basis of a fixed conceptual division between law and politics. True, even in American law, there are those who call for greater 'formalism' (for our purposes, greater separation between law and politics) but, unlike the conceptual approach, they typically invoke explicitly political or institutional arguments in support of their position.
B AN ILLUSTRATION: THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE COMMON LAW
When the fundamental difference in English and American law's conceptualization of the relationship between law and politics is brought to light, many of the differences between the two legal systems become clearer. Some of the differences, such as English courts' greater reluctance to enter into issues that are politically contested, are in plain view; 47 some, like English courts' greater adherence to precedent, go slightly deeper. 48 Some go deeper still: the issues that preoccupy legal debates, the very different style of legal scholarship, the views regarding the relationship between the common law and statute law, even the dominant jurisprudential theories. The differences also have implications beyond the strict limits of legal doctrine; I believe, for example, that the different approaches to legal education in the two countries are, at least in part, explicable by this fundamental distinction. 49 Here I wish to highlight a less familiar issue explained by the different attitude toward law and politics; namely, the attitude toward the universality of the common law. This difference is particularly relevant in the context of restitution because much of the doctrinal work on unjust enrichment has been a joint effort of scholars from all over the Commonwealth. This is no coincidence. A fundamental idea that underlies, often quite explicitly, much of the work of doctrinal scholars is that the common law is some kind of single unified system such that solutions reached in one jurisdiction should be largely the same as in the others. 50 This is treated not merely as a reflection of common historical origin but as a fact of normative significance that implies that divergences between common law jurisdictions are thought to be a cause for concern in a way that, say, differences between English and French law are not. 51 This practice, importantly, is not the result of the ease of access to judicial decisions in English because American court decisions (and American legal scholarship) are treated differently from decisions from the rest of the English-speaking world. Likewise, divergences between English law and American law are not considered a cause for alarm in the way that divergences between English and Australian or Canadian courts are.
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From the other direction, American courts do not usually care about legal developments in common law jurisdictions outside the United States, and most American legal academics are similarly uninterested in non-US law and legal scholarship.
The political significance of all this has not been fully appreciated. For the doctrinal scholar, the experiences of other common law jurisdictions do not merely provide a host of examples and ideas. Rather, the common law is, in some deep sense, a single legal system that adheres to the same principles. This conception of transnational common law is significant because it provides support to the idea of the common law as non-political. The Commonwealth countries are spread all over the globe and, despite shared historical origins, they are now independent political entities. If their common law is common, this can only be because that law is governed by a set of autonomous rules that transcend politics. This is the exact corollary of the Birksian view that there are some correct principles of unjust enrichment that common law courts and commentators are working together to identify. Appealing to the law of another country is an illegitimate abdication of sovereignty if laws are a reflection of a political will; if, on the other hand, law is perceived as a matter of expertise achieved through the elucidation and refinement of law's autonomous principles, then such worries are misplaced. For proponents of this view, the combined efforts of judges and lawyers in these jurisdictions are the proof, and the guarantee, that private law remains distinct from politics. This attitude explains both why Commonwealth lawyers find American law a less appropriate source for citation and why Americans, in turn, are reluctant to cite the cases of other jurisdictions. From the Commonwealth lawyer's perspective, American decisions are less 'eligible' for citation exactly because law in the United States is more self-consciously political: it is difficult to see it as belonging to the same ideal of nonpolitical law. 53 Thus, while the citation of an Australian decision by an English court in some sense strengthens the sense of law as a non-political domain, the citation of American decisions has the opposite effect by tainting the non-political purity of Commonwealth common law.
For their part, American lawyers are much less willing to look to other jurisdictions for inspiration or ideas. This reluctance is found across the board: contract and tort are no different from constitutional or administrative law; and common law jurisdictions are no different in this regard from civil law jurisdictions. If all law is in some sense the product of politics and the means for promoting political ends, then reliance on the law of another country is prima facie illegitimate. Already, in The Federalist Papers, James Madison wrote that 'neither the common nor the statute law of [England] , or of any other nation, ought to be a standard for proceedings of this [nation], unless previously made its own by legislative adoption'; 54 that is, unless it has been accepted in a process that 53 More precisely, the move away from doctrinal scholarship and a non-political view of law began around the 1940s. It is, therefore, not uncommon to see citation to American materials from that period. This is particularly true in the area of unjust enrichment, where much of the impetus for the modern development came from the United States. Indeed, even when agreeing on substantive outcomes with some other jurisdiction, the idea that American lawyers should aim to align their law with that of other countries or that they have some cause for concern if it does not would strike many of them as preposterous.
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In one sense, none of this will come as news to lawyers: the differences between the two countries in matters like parliamentary sovereignty, judicial review, judicial engagement in politically sensitive matters, and so on are all too obvious to ignore. But acknowledgement of these differences is usually limited to public law. What I try to show next is that these distinctions are relevant to private law because, they are relevant to the question of what counts as private law and, perhaps more importantly, to the question of why something counts as private law. I will argue that the distinction between private law and public law should be understood as a product of the English view on the relationship between law and politics, not as its source. By contrast, the very different conception of the relationship between law and politics explains why American lawyers have long considered the distinction between private and public law suspect.
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V The effects of the relationship between law and politics on restitution law and scholarship
The last section has taken us very far afield. It is time to go back to the discussion with which we started. Recall that we were trying to explain two questions, not just one: first, why restitution law does not play a With some simplification the view I associated with English law can be summarized syllogistically as follows:
1. Law and politics, properly understood, are mutually exclusive. 2. Therefore, a political answer to a problem is, by definition, not a legal one. 3. Abolition of entrenched doctrines is a political kind of change. 4. Therefore, it is one that only the legislature can bring about. 5. Therefore, it is one that is unavailable to the lawyer. This forms part of the worldview, or what I called earlier, the 'ideology' of the English legal system against which restitution lawyers were working. Nonetheless, faced with situations where existing legal categories resulted in outcomes that were deemed unjust but based on 'trite law' that seemed beyond change, a legal solution was sometimes felt to be needed. Restitution provided the answer, and it proved particularly useful because it has at its core an element that allows for its unlimited expansion. The most important element within the unjust enrichment model is that of an 'unjust factor.' A successful plaintiff must be able to show that the defendant's enrichment at her expense falls under one of several recognized unjust factors or else her claim will fail. The list is made up of a hodge-podge of considerations that have little in common especially once we account for the so-called 'policy-motivated' unjust factors. 58 Thus, the very feature that makes unjust enrichment attractive -its ability to keep the law in line with common sense morality -is what makes it a potential threat to the entire doctrinal edifice and the separation of law from politics. One sees this tension in debates among English lawyers about the principle of unjust enrichment. For a long time, there was resistance to the idea that such a principle was part of the common law: one judge described it as a 'well-meaning sloppiness of thought' 60 and, as late as 1977, we were told by the House of Lords that a general principle of unjust enrichment (as opposed to 'specific remedies in particular cases') is not recognized in English law. 61 These sceptics were not opposed to some of the doctrines now subsumed under this heading (such as the doctrine that the recipient of a mistaken payment ought to give it up) but rather to the introduction of a category which, despite good intentions, was not sufficiently constraining, not sufficiently legal. In terms of the present discussion, the perceived danger was that unjust enrichment's doctrinal open-endedness would bring down the separation of law from politics. It is exactly for this reason, therefore, that the defenders of unjust enrichment have been so insistent that unjust enrichment, despite appearances, has little to do with justice and why they tried to show just how much the law has shed its older loose and vague formulations to become a doctrinally respectable area in which 'the judges simply ask themselves "is this enrichment unjust?"' and this question is determined as 'a matter of law.' 62 Many of the seemingly purely doctrinal debates in this area of law are, in part, a reflection of this tension between the desire to keep the doctrine loose enough to serve the role of solving problems in other areas of law but not too loose as to undermine its doctrinal respectability.
If I am right about this, then it is not difficult to see why restitution law (and the principle against unjust enrichment) played a much more significant role within English (and Commonwealth) law than it has in American law in the last fifty or so years. The primary motivation for unjust enrichment law was a felt need to circumvent various doctrines that were thought to lead to unjust results but were also considered too entrenched to eliminate. Unjust enrichment was new and thus sufficiently malleable, and it was perhaps inherently somewhat looser than other areas of law. It could be applied to a much broader range of situations than either tort or contract. And, with sufficient doctrinal work, it was considered sufficiently 'legal' to assuage fears of the politicization of private law.
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The American story is different. To the extent that American courts and academics were still trying to maintain the separation of law from politics, they still had some use for restitution, although even here they were probably less concerned with precedent or doctrinal constraints than their English counterparts. (It is, therefore, not a coincidence that this doctrinal innovation was imported into Commonwealth law from the United States.) But as the idea of law's being separate from politics was largely abandoned, so was the interest in the reasoned elaboration of doctrine. American courts still continued to base their judgments on traditional doctrinal materials (even though they have always been much more sympathetic to academic work than English courts), 64 but they did so while openly acknowledging the underlying normative considerations at stake, and they showed greater willingness to abandon old doctrines that did not seem fitting for changing times. Thus, for instance, in the United States, the solution to the problem of the battle of the forms mentioned above was achieved by changing the rules on offer and acceptance and was classified as part of contract law. The famous section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code maintains that, under certain conditions, a contract may be formed even when the acceptance is in a form that introduces changes to the offer. Similar ideas were adopted long before by the courts. 65 And even if courts had to base their judgments on doctrine, there was no reason for academics to constrain themselves in this way. American legal academics have come to see themselves as engaged in normative debates on what the law should be, and on these matters, doctrine has come to be perceived as a somewhat sinister means of obscuring the real (normative, political) issues at stake. It was thus difficult to see how engaging in doctrinal scholarship could provide real help in addressing the issues the courts face. 66 All this only makes the question posed at the beginning of this article even more pertinent. If American law is much more concerned with engaging people with moral and political questions, why did American academic lawyers not turn to normative, 'theoretical' work on unjust enrichment in the way they did with contract or tort law? The answer should by now be clear: unjust enrichment law was a product of the particular need to solve legal problems in a particular way. It was a solution to an essentially legal problem, but those who were not hampered by this problem had relatively little need for it. If it is accepted that a main role of unjust enrichment law was to solve problems in other areas of law, the American lawyer's response would more likely have been: let's change the original law. Why add a layer of doctrinal complexity, when the source of the problem can be removed more directly? Even if the courts sometimes marched to a beat similar to that of their Commonwealth counterparts, 67 the higher level of theoretical abstraction, unjust enrichment could not add much to the discussion on the appropriate boundaries of property rights; on what is considered a 'taking'; or on the normative implications of autonomy, fairness, or efficiency. In other words, the reason there was relatively little non-doctrinal unjust enrichment scholarship was that it was not perceived to have much non-doctrinal intellectual meat. I might still be challenged that what looks like a great divide is only a mirage, a reflection of the particular (or peculiar) interests of American academic lawyers. According to this view, on both sides of the Atlantic, lawyers rely on restitutionary ideas in roughly equal measure, but it is American legal academics' lack of interest in doctrinal questions that obscures the rather similar state of the law. 68 There are several responses to this claim. First, even if it is entirely true, we are still left with a puzzlealthough perhaps a less significant one -and that is why American academic lawyers are relatively uninterested in writing on this area of law unlike their English and Commonwealth counterparts. Second, despite the greater divide between legal practice and academic law in the United States, there is an inevitable connection between them. Those who end up in legal practice get their first legal training in law school, and if someone does not encounter unjust enrichment there, unjust enrichment may just not be part of the conceptual toolbox she uses later in practice. Third and most important, virtually all of those who have considered the United States-Commonwealth divide on unjust enrichment have concluded that the differences are found, not only in the law reviews, but also in the law reports.
B THE PLACE OF LEGAL REALISM
Superficially, all this fits the realist story told by Saiman and Langbein. Many of the realists denounced the kind of conceptualism that is a token of doctrinal scholarship. Felix Cohen, most famously, scathingly attacked the idea that there is some conceptual truth to be discovered about legal questions. 69 shared with Karl Llewellyn who thought legal title was a 'mystical' idea. 70 Less famously but just as importantly, Cohen attacked the idea that legal criticism is, in some sense, based on logic: the only significant basis for legal criticism, he said, was that the law was morally wrong. 71 Such a view often translates to contempt of what is sometimes called 'juridical reason,' especially if one believes that legal doctrine alone cannot provide a very strong constraint on a judge's ability to get to the outcome she wants. This, famously, is also something that many legal realists believed. 72 In truth, however, the story is more complex because, to the extent that legal doctrine is nowadays less important in the United States than in England, putting the blame (or the praise) on the realists ignores the background described above about law and politics. As I see it, the realist attack on legal concepts is grounded in a particular view about the relationship between law and politics. It is based either on a rejection of the view that legal rules are there to keep lawyers and political considerations apart or on the view that, if that is the aim of legal rules, they fail miserably in this task. On this point, I believe, the legal realists, or more precisely their success and lasting influence in the United States, are the effect, not the cause. Put differently, to invoke the legal realists' dislike for doctrinal scholarship as the reason for American lawyers' lack of interest in contemporary doctrinal work on restitution is not to offer an answer to the question but merely to restate it. What must be explained are the origins of legal realism and, especially in a comparative context, its disparate impact in different jurisdictions. The question is not, or not only, why legal realism emerged in the United States and not elsewhere. The answer to this question involves various intertwining factors having to do with the earlier professionalization of American universities, the early emergence of the American law school as an integral part of the university system, and a 'revolt against formalism' 73 that crossed disciplinary boundaries in American universities at the time. But we should not forget that broadly similar realist ideas emerged in many countries around the same time: in France, François Gény and Léon Duguit expressed such views; in Germany, there was Jhering and later the 'free law' movement; 74 and in Scandinavia, there was a 'realist' movement parallel to the American one. 75 In fact, even England had its small band of 'legal realists' working around the same period that the American legal realists came to prominence.
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The significant question is why, despite all this, realist ideas have had much greater staying power in the United States, where they have taken deep root and affected the way law is taught, researched, and conceived, but have had a much weaker impact elsewhere. In the context of this article, the interesting question is why, even after being shown the American example, most English scholars remained not just unenthusiastic but often openly hostile to legal realism. Such questions obviously do not lend themselves to a single, simple answer, but I believe an important ingredient of the answer has to do with the different perceptions already existing (or emerging) at the time on the respective roles of and relationships between law and politics in the American and English (or British) political traditions. 77 Realist ideas took hold in the United States because the periods prior to their emergence saw more overt ties between law and politics, especially, but not exclusively, in constitutional law. While it is true that, on the surface, most legal realists seemed relatively unconcerned with the question of the relationship between law and politics and with the impact of judges' political opinions on the outcome of cases, 78 I think it is this background that made realist ideas To further develop the point just made, I will return now to a matter that has so far has only been briefly alluded to but which I think fits the story told here very well, and that is that there is actually some American scholarship that invokes restitutionary ideas but this work is very different from the English and Commonwealth doctrinal work on unjust enrichment. For this, we need to distinguish between a cause of action in unjust enrichment and restitutionary (gain-based) remedies. As a cause of action, unjust enrichment is discussed by American lawyers primarily in those areas in which it is thought that existing legal doctrine has a gap that is thought incapable of addressing an existing injustice.
To put the matter in somewhat rough terms, whereas in English law unjust enrichment has been developed as a distinctly legal supplement for solving problems with existing doctrines in other areas of law that lawyers felt incapable of solving within those areas of law, for American lawyers the main use for restitutionary ideas has been the development of new grounds for liability where none existed before. Claims for reparation for historical wrongs provide an excellent example. 80 Central to this understanding of unjust enrichment is the view that the 'soul of unjust enrichment . . . includes flexibility, creativity, justice and morality underpinnings, and discretion. been enthusiastic about extending restitution in that direction. 82 One such critic has even contrasted doctrinal scholars' commitment to the 'principle of unjust enrichment' with the 'politics' that underlies the restitutionary ideas he found in the United States. 83 The other area where we have seen some American interest is the question of restitution as a remedy, and this too is consistent with the view I outlined above. Within the approach favoured by Commonwealth lawyers, there is a conceptual connection between particular types of claim and particular remedies, and as a result, the area of remedies has remained relatively undeveloped. In American law, there was a reversal of roles. The content of one's rights (or, as they became more neutrally to be called, 'entitlements') has come to be seen as determined by the remedies one could get for their violation. This led academic lawyers to explore the question of remedies at levels of sophistication unmatched by (and largely unknown to) Commonwealth lawyers. 84 And it is here that the possibility of a remedy based on the defendant's gain rather than the plaintiff's loss (as opposed to the question of whether there is a distinct domain of 'unjust enrichment') has attracted some attention. But this attention is likely to disappoint friends of unjust enrichment: the question of whether there is room for gain-based remedies is one that can be raised alongside a broad range of remedies that could all be attached to different claims, whether these are classified as belonging to contract, torts, patent violation, 'unjust enrichment,' or anything else. Therefore, the sort of arguments used in deciding whether to award or withhold such remedies are analysed largely in consequentialist terms and touch on considerations that English proponents of unjust enrichment are likely to consider alien to the subject. 85 Saiman notices this point and ascribes this break between rights and remedies to legal realism. 86 Loosely speaking, the connection is correct although once again the picture is more complex. 87 more complete explanation has to include the main thesis of this article about the location of law with regard to politics. The view that sees a conceptual connection between certain legal rights and certain legal remedies is apolitical to the extent that it denies that available legal remedies should be determined according to normative judgments external to legal concepts. Birks provided a clear statement of this view in the context of considering the issue of priority among creditors in insolvency. He rejected the view that this matter should be determined by an attempt at assessing which solution would lead to better consequences. As he put it, '[f]or my part I find it difficult to say who deserves to suffer or which groups deserve to suffer more than others. Giving an answer to changing the answer already given seems to be precisely the kind of issue which has to be left to the legislature.' 88 These are the sort of considerations that a political body should take and, as such, they are beyond the remit of legal argument. According to the approach Birks favoured, 'the business of the lawyer can only be to say with as much precision as possible on what facts proprietary interests arise.' 89 This view makes much sense as both a statement of the separateness of law and politics and as a strategy for keeping them like that.
Understanding rights in terms of remedies -understanding legal entitlements as the sum total of the remedies they can give rise to -is easier to accept when law is understood in broadly political terms. On this view, the appropriate remedy is not determined by its 'form,' by correct location of the event in question on the legal 'map.' Instead, legal rights are thought of as nothing more than entitlements to certain legal protections, and the limits of those legal protections are determined by normative considerations that legal doctrine cannot provide. This does not necessarily mean that judges will always undertake a detailed cost benefit analysis in search of the optimal remedy in every individual case. They may not have the means or data to do that (and it is here that legal scholars may come to their aid); but it does mean that there is no principled argument against, say, taking deterrence considerations into account when deciding whether to award restitutionary remedies or not, and it does mean that, in practice, remedies will be subject to the impact of political argument, unmediated by legal form. From a doctrinal perspective, this is conceptual confusion and a dangerous development in that it undermines the division between law and politics. perspective, legal categories are tools to be used for the sake of promoting normative goals. This is precisely the approach one finds much more often among American restitution scholars and in American courts.
D A NOTE ON THE DEBATES AMONG RESTITUTION LAWYERS
The argument developed above was mainly focused on the difference in modern attitudes to restitution in England (and to varying degrees the rest of the Commonwealth) and the United States; but I think that it can also help us understand existing debates among English (and Commonwealth) unjust enrichment scholars, often presented as debates about the 'nature' of this area of law. On one side stand those who adopt the broadly Birksian position, who insist on the reality of unjust enrichment; and on the other stand the unjust enrichment sceptics, some of whom doubt whether this area, unjust enrichment law, even exists. Consider, once again, the case of mistaken payment. The question -whether the recipient should give up the money received -is simple, as is the legal outcome. The competing explanations offered as to why are, nonetheless, very different, although they, too, are not very difficult to understand. Where, then, does all the disagreement come from?
One characteristic aspect of the debate, at times amusing but more often frustrating, is the disparity in the kinds of arguments used and the sources used to substantiate them. Proponents of the proprietary approach often invoke broadly moral and political considerations; their respondents then answer by appealing to cases. 91 Each side finds the other's way of arguing for their outcome puzzling. This difference becomes less puzzling once it is realized that the two sides to the debate are committed to different views on the proper way of developing and improving the law. I am confident that, if the matter were to be examined empirically, it would be found that there is strong correlation between those who think that unjust enrichment is a real legal category and those who think that the development of law must be based on the 90 See generally Dagan, Restitution, supra note 10. Dagan, ibid at 25-6, is unsurprisingly unenthusiastic about the 'unjust enrichment' label and explicitly identifies his subject as concerned with gain-based remedies; see ibid at 26: 'I suggest viewing unjust enrichment as a loose framework . . . By a loose framework I mean a mere placeholder for arranging and classifying legal rules that involve benefit-based liability or benefit-based recovery and that -for whatever reason -do not find a comfortable home in another field.' 91 Consider: '[W]hatever the position Hedley's attacks on the unjust enrichment school of thought first started, the judicial tide of opinion has turned in favour of explicitly applying the unjust enrichment principle'; Burrows, The Law of Restitution, supra note 18 at 35. I suspect those in the other group will not consider this argument relevant, let alone decisive.
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(2013) 63 UTLJ © UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS analysis and elaboration of legal materials, on the one hand, and those who are critical of unjust enrichment and tend to the view that law must primarily be explained and justified by appeal to external moral standards, on the other. For those in the second group, the fact that one can find cases that mention unjust enrichment is largely irrelevant to the question of whether unjust enrichment 'exists.' For them, our primary consideration when considering the structure of the law is matching the law, not with doctrine, but with moral and political principles. From this perspective, the principle of unjust enrichment appears largely superfluous. So here we have one important moral for those engaged in the debates on the status of unjust enrichment: until you agree on the question of law and politics, the likelihood of one side's adducing arguments that the other finds potentially convincing or even relevant -the likelihood, in other words, of genuine debate -is small indeed. Since it is unlikely that an answer to this question will be forthcoming any time soon, the question of the 'nature' of unjust enrichment is likely to remain contested for a long time. VI 
Conclusion
In most comparative discussions English and American law are still treated as belonging to one 'family,' one legal tradition, one that, in fact, is quite often called the 'Anglo-American' legal tradition. In some respects, no doubt the classification is still valid and valuable, but on some issues, it can be misleading. The question considered in this article addresses one of those. The explanation offered here for their divergence on unjust enrichment is that answering this question requires, not simply stating that doctrinal scholarship has become much less popular in the United States than in England, but rather explaining why this happened. The answer offered here is, first, that largely through the work of doctrinal scholars, restitution law has come to occupy in English law the role of resolving problems in areas in which legal doctrine seemed to lead to unjust results but was thought too deeply entrenched for change. It then argued that such ossification of doctrine was possible because of a particular conception of the common law as non-political, one that, in turn, was believed to impose certain limits on the sort and scope of legal change courts can bring about. The rise of unjust enrichment in English law was, then, explained as a solution to an internal legal problem that is the result of the normative foundations of English law and its conceptualization in relation to politics. It is this conceptualization that has been largely abandoned in the United States, and with its demise, the need for developing unjust enrichment as a distinct legal category declined as well. This fact, itself, has a complex relationship with legal realism, but my argument has sought to show that it cannot be fully explained as caused by legal realism; rather, at least to some extent, it predates it and is better understood as one of the causes of legal realism or rather of its lasting success.
The article has also touched on more abstract questions of which I wish to highlight two. One is the question of the relationship between law and politics. It should be clear that I reject the view that these two domains are, as a conceptual matter, separate just as much as I reject the view that, as a conceptual matter, they are tied. Rather, as I have sought to show, my view is that there are various ways of understanding their relationship which result in different understandings of what law is. The other is the divide that exists in legal philosophy between the search for what is called, misleadingly I think, 'the nature of law,' on the one hand, and the theoretical questions relating to particular areas of law, on the other hand. The former inquiry is typically presented as conceptual and morally neutral, the latter as normative; and thus the two seem to be relatively independent of each other. I reject this this divide because I believe both should be understood as part of one political inquiry. As the present article has shown, normative choices at the level of the 'nature' of law have normative implications on what particular areas of law look like.
